Re (2): Glenn Hubbard (the dean you mention) has a relatively long history (depending on who you ask, of course) of having dubious ideas on economics. For example: http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/10/culture-of-fraud..., Krugman's blog has lots of examples.
So in that context, writing a report "at the behest of Iceland's Chamber of Commerce" is pretty small potatoes. It's far more likely that they commissioned a report knowing Hubbard's own views in advance, which makes it dodgy as hell, but not quite corruption. And in any case, many of those arguments about market reforms and deregulation really ought to be assessed on merits (which are objectively poor), with who's paying for them being more of a side note. It's also arguable that a professional body would not solve these kinds of problems. It'd be hard to build an argument against a profession by focussing on just one hack.
Re (1): taking an economics model and pushing it to production involves a genuinely considerable amount of work. "Make more privately" would mean something along the lines of getting hired by a hedge fund as consultant. There are also other incentives involved: first, academia generally urges people to publish. Second, having a model be published is part of the way it is accepted by practitioners too: if you just come up with a random model, it would have to be insanely good to convince anyone to put their money behind it, otherwise they'll require you to get other people to assess it, and you'll have to publish it in a peer-reviewed journal. The exception would be really specialized models, where you think you found an arbitrage opportunity or something (even then it's not completely clear, see, e.g., the literature on selling deep out-of-money puts).
1) Historically Keynes is certainly known for profiting on foreign exchange bets, Irving Fisher on the other hand is notorious for predicting multiple times that the recovery of the 1929 crash was about to begin - and his funds followed his predictions into oblivion.
2) It was Fredrik Mishkin - and he was paid well over $100,000 for it.
This is the report, and it's worth reading because it encapsulates just about everything that is wrong with macro-economics, from theory to corruption. Understand that all anybody had to do at the time to understand how badly off the rails the Icelandic Banks were was to look at their balance sheets in their annual reports.
So in most science, if someone comes out with a study saying that (say, for example) climate change isn't real, they'll be buried under the remaining 99% that came to consensus in the other direction.
Sure, Industry will bankroll lobbyists to fight any potential change in government, and fund crackpot theories, but ultimately, the evidence that will accrue will be damning.
Why wasn't that the case for Iceland? Why doesn't that happen more for economics as a whole?
Is it a function of time? In economics, people are more focused on sub 10 year plot lines? Perhaps our understanding of macroeconomics is so poor that we're surprised by "big changes" every few years, and evidence doesn't get a chance to accrue? Whereas evidence for climate change can accrue year after year?
1) is laughable. Economics is hardly developed enough for someone to a.) come up with a theory "no body else" has and b.) have that theory be specific enough that one individual in a short amount of time could profit greatly from it and c.) studies a topic that's so chaotic the best theories of it are "long term" - i.e. 10s-100s of years, not days. The exceptions to my point here are so widely known as to not be profitable or not really be 'doing economics'
2) By the nature of the work of an economist there will always be people who want to say they're an economist so people will 'follow them'. Everyone has an opinion about the economy. The best system in place is the academic route - university education, accreditation, and peer review. Those aren't perfect. I'm saying they're the best we're likely to get.
3) I'd say economists either work in academia, government, or private enterprise. In academia they're refining theories, teaching, and publishing. In government and private they're running numbers. In private enterprise, I'd say they're expected to tell who ever what that person wants to hear in the way they want to hear it.
So in that context, writing a report "at the behest of Iceland's Chamber of Commerce" is pretty small potatoes. It's far more likely that they commissioned a report knowing Hubbard's own views in advance, which makes it dodgy as hell, but not quite corruption. And in any case, many of those arguments about market reforms and deregulation really ought to be assessed on merits (which are objectively poor), with who's paying for them being more of a side note. It's also arguable that a professional body would not solve these kinds of problems. It'd be hard to build an argument against a profession by focussing on just one hack.
Re (1): taking an economics model and pushing it to production involves a genuinely considerable amount of work. "Make more privately" would mean something along the lines of getting hired by a hedge fund as consultant. There are also other incentives involved: first, academia generally urges people to publish. Second, having a model be published is part of the way it is accepted by practitioners too: if you just come up with a random model, it would have to be insanely good to convince anyone to put their money behind it, otherwise they'll require you to get other people to assess it, and you'll have to publish it in a peer-reviewed journal. The exception would be really specialized models, where you think you found an arbitrage opportunity or something (even then it's not completely clear, see, e.g., the literature on selling deep out-of-money puts).